VehicleFireCaseStudyVEHICLEFIRECASESTUDYCaseStudyIntent:TheVehicleFireCaseStudyisintendedtofamiliarizestudentswiththetrainingrequirementsandpolicieswhencominguponavehicleand/orstructurefire.Materials/Equipment:InteragencyStandardsforFireandFireAviationOperations(Redbook)IncidentResponsePocketGuide(IRPG)FacilitatorInformation:ThiscasestudydescribestheeventsthatoccurredwhenBLMenginemodulesrespondedtowildlandfireinSouthwesternIdaho.Uponarrivalonscene,modulemembersfoundavehicle,horsetrailer,andsurroundingareashadignitedandwerestillburning.EmphasisshouldbeplacedonthepolicyregardingvehiclefiresintheInteragencyStandardsforFireandFireAviationOperations.ReviewthecasestudyandbecomefamiliarwiththeVehicleFireCaseStudytodeterminewhatinformationisgiventothestudentsandwhatwillbeaskedofthestudents.Priortopresentingthecasestudy,theinstructorshoulddividethestudentsintosmallgroupsofthreeorfour.Onceintosmallgroups,allow10minutesforstudentstoindividuallyreadthescenarioand10minutestoanswerasagroupthefivequestionsfoundintheirStudentWorkbooks.1.AsengineoperatorsandBLMemployees,whatwerethecrew’ssuppressionresponsibilities?RefertotheBLMManual9200policystatementregardingvehicleandstructurefires.2.Didtheenginemodulesactwithintheirscopeoftraining?Shouldtheyhavedonesomethingelse?Yes.Theyputoutthefirethatwasburninginthegrass.TheyalsoprovidedwatertothenewPlymouthRuralFireDepartment.No.TheyfollowedthepolicyintheBLMmanual.VehicleFireCaseStudy3.Iftherewasstillsomeoneinsidethevehiclewouldthatchangethewaytheyresponded?Whataretheiroptions?Yes.BLMManual9200states,“Actionswillbelimitedtotheexteriorofthestructureorvehicleunlessthereisimmediatethreattohumanlife.”4.Whatifahorsewasstillinsidethetrailer?Thismaypresentanethicaldilemmatostudentsasthemanualstates“threattohumanlife.”5.CouldtheruralfiredepartmentordertheBLMenginecrewtoassistwithextinguishingthevehiclefire?No,wildlandfirefighterscannotbeforcedtoperformanunsafeactorsomethingoutsidetheirscopeoftraining.RefertotheIRPGfor“HowtoProperlyRefuseRisk.”Afterthesmallgroupshaveansweredthequestions,havegroupspresenttheirfindingstotherestoftheclass.Allowforfeedbackanddiscussionfocusingonscopeoftrainingandpolicyinterpretation.Instructorsareencouragedtoaddhypotheticalsituationsandquestionstothecasestudy.Examplesinclude:•Whatarethelegalramificationsofactingoutsideanengineoperator’sscopeoftraining?•Whatpoliciesexistfortakingactiononastructurefire?VehicleFireCaseStudyVEHICLEFIRECASESTUDYDateofIncident:July27,1998TimeofIncident:1404hoursMDTJurisdiction:LowerSnakeRiverDistrict,IdahoIncidentLocation:SouthwesternIdahoPredictedWeatherForecastThunderstormsWinds:5-15mph,SEtoSWTemperatures:86-102°FRelativehumidity:13-25%BLMManual9200“Bureauemployeesmayonlytakedirectactiononstructureorvehiclefireswhenadequatelocalfirefightingforcesarenotyetpresent.Actionswillbelimitedtotheexteriorofthestructureorvehicleunlessthereisimmediatethreattohumanlife.EmployeesmustnotknowinglybeplacedinapositionwhereexposuretonoxiousgasesorchemicalsorothersituationsrequiringtheuseofSCBAs.BLMunitswillwithdrawfromthesuppressionofstructural/vehiclefireswhenlocalfireagencyunitsarriveinsufficientforce.”ScenarioOnJuly27,1998,at1402hours,BoiseInteragencyDispatchdispatchedtwoBLMType4engines(Engines7140and7141)andonecommandvehicle(Command7126)fromtheWildWestGuardStationtoafirereportedbytheSquawButte...