SPECIFICTOPICSSpecifictopic3:OrganisationalchangeandtransitionmanagementIntroductionThiscanrangefromsimplelimitedchange(e.g.apparentlyminorchangeinsupervisionarrangementsforshifts)throughdelayering,takeover/mergerchanges,multi-skillingetctoafullbusinessprocessre-engineering(BPR)exercise.Thekeyissueistheidentificationandassessmentofeffects(directandindirect)onthecontrolofMAHsonsitefromaproposedchange,andduringthetransitiontothenewstructure.InthecaseoftheapparentlyminorsupervisorychangeataTTsite,therewasareal–butunassessed–impactonthiscontrol,andtheteamprovidedsubstantialsupportfortheinspectorconcernedindealingwiththis.TheHumanFactorsTeamhavedevelopedandpublishedaninformationsheetonthemanagementoforganisationchangeGuidanceisavailable(ContractResearchReport348/2001,commonlyreferredtoasthe‘Entecreport’)ondeterminingstaffinglevels.Thisdoesnot,however,providealltheanswers.Itcanbeusedtoconfirm(ornot)thatthelevelsofstaffinginplace/proposedareadequate,butifthelevelisnotadequatetheguidancewillnottellyoubyhowmuchitneedstobeincreased(i.e.needstobeusediterativelytodetermineanadequatelevel).ThisEntecguidancedoesnotworkwellforhighlyautomatedplant.Fig9:ManagingorganisationalchangeStep1GettingorganisedHaveastrongpolicyMakesenior-levelmanagersaccountableHaveaclearchange-managementprocedureCommunicateandincludeeveryoneReviewandchallengeStep2RiskassessmentIdentifythepeopleinvolvedIdentifyallchangesAssesstherisksConsiderhumanfactors,competenceandworkloadTestscenariosStep3ImplementingandmonitoringProvideenoughresourcestomakethechangesafelyMonitorrisksduringchangeKeepyourplanunderreview,trackactionsMonitorperformanceafterchangeReviewyourchangepolicySpecificdocumentsInadditiontothegeneraldocumentsthatshouldberequestedpriortothevisit(seechapter‘AimoftheGuidance’)itisrecommendedthatthefollowingdocuments,whicharespecifictothistopic,shouldalsoberequested:1.Managementof(organisational)changepolicyand/orprocedure;2.Riskassessmentsfrompreviousorcurrentchangeprocess.EnforcementandadviceImprovementandProhibitionNoticeshavebeenissuedontransitionriskassessmentandtrainingformajorBPRexerciseatalargeTTchemicalsite.Extensiveadviceandsupportformajororganisationalchangeatanoilterminalfollowingnewownership.TheHumanFactorsTeamalsorecentlyprovidedsupportforanextensiveinvestigationoforganisationalchangeoffshore.ThisisanareaforwhichtheHumanFactorsTeamhavedevelopedmuchexpertise.Guidance3.Businessre-engineeringandhealthandsafetymanagement:bestpracticemodelContractResearchReport123/1996.4.Organisationalchangeandmajorhazards;ChemicalInformationSheetNoCHIS7(seebelow)5.Assessingthesafetyofstaffingarrangementsforprocessoperationsinthechemicalandalliedindustries;HSEContractResearchReport348/2001.6.DevelopmentofamultiskillinglifecyclemodelHSEContractResearchReport328/2001.Questionset:OrganisationalchangeandtransitionmanagementQuestionSiteresponseInspectorsviewImprovementsneeded1Istherearobustprocedureformanagementoforganisationalchangewith:7.Clearobjectives?8.Clearleadershipfromseniormanagement?9.Structured,toaprescribed,consistentprocess,thorough,welldocumented?2Isthereanassessmentprocessthat:•IdentifiesandmapsallchangestobothtasksandpersonnelthatcouldhaveanimpactonMHprevention,nomatterhowsmallthechange?•Isfacilitatedbywell-trainedpersonsindependentofthefacilitybeingassessed?3Doestheriskassessmentmethodologyguideassessorstotakefull,realisticaccountoftherangeofhumanreliability?Thismayinclude:•Workload(includingnon-productivework);•Competence;•Workpriorities;•Teamworkandcommunication.4Whereapplicable,arethererealisticassessmentsoftheorganisation’shandlingofarangeofcrisisscenariospost-change,includingupsets,escalatingincidentsandemergencies?5Areallassessmentsfullyparticipative,ensuringthattheknowledge(includinginformallyheldknowledge)andviewsofpeopleinvolvedisgatheredandgivendispassionateconsideration?6Ifoutsourcingisconsidered:•Ismajoraccidentpreventionacceptedascorebusiness?•Aretherearrangementstocontinue,andresource,effectivecontrolofoutsourcedmajoraccidentrisks?•Haveappropriateperformanceindicatorsbeenselectedforsignsofdegradationofperformance?7Whererequired,isthereacompetenceassuranceprocesstoensureadequatetransitionarrangements?•Doesitincludeidentificationoftrainingneedsforchangedoradditionalrolesinrelationtomajorhazards/processsafety–bearinginmindthatsomekeyknowledgemaywellnotbedocumented?•Isthereadequateplanningforcompetentcoverduringthetrainingperiod?8Isthereanoverallviewofsiteorbusiness-widerequirementsforthecoretechnicalcompetenciesrequiredtokeeprisks‘ALARP’,includingcapacityforengineeringandadequate,intelligentsupervisionofcontractors?QuestionSiteresponseInspectorsviewImprovementsneeded9Isthereamechanismforreviewingdecisions,andtoensurethatallnecessarymeasuresareinplacebefore‘go-live’?10Arethereplanstomonitorperformanceindicatorswellbeyondtheendofthetransition?